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Note
Ratcheting Up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause
Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements
Julie Long
The North American Free Trade Agreement1 (NAFTA) and
the Uruguay Round Agreements 2 represent an unprecedented
step toward the full globalization of the U.S. economy.3 The
1. President Bush signed the North American Free Trade Agreement on
December 17, 1992. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA-N. 2552, 2557. Congress approved it through the
NAlFTA Implementation Act on December 8, 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Act]. The agreement provides for the
liberalization of trade relations between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. See in-
fra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
2. The United States signed the Uruguay Round Agreements, negotiated
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
(GATT), on April 15, 1994. H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1994), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 3773, 3782. Congress approved it
through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act on December 8,1994. Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4813 (1994) (hereinafter Uruguay Round Act]. The agree-
ment provides for the liberalization and expansion of world trade and the devel-
opment of a framework through which members negotiate international terms
of competition. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (examining the
mechanics of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
3. In his Presidential Message submitted to Congress with the proposed
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, President Clinton characterized the agree-
ments as the "broadest, most comprehensive trade agreements in history. They
are vital to our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an
improved standard of living for all Americans." PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TRANS-
MITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, reprinted in URUGUAY
RouND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXT OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATE-
MENT OF ADmINSTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 1
(1994). One commentator characterized the Uruguay Round Agreements as
"among the most important legislative verdicts of this decade - decisively shap-
ing the United States' relationship with the world in the 21st century." Peter
Behr, GATT is Legislative Landmark but Trade Remains a Divisive Issue,
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at A26. In addition, one commentator compared the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the organization created as the adminis-
trative organ of the Uruguay Round Agreements, to the United Nations and
described it as "a powerful international body, equipped to bring down barriers
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agreements encompass promises on the part of the signatories to
set the terms of competition through international negotiation, 4
and to ensure that internal measures at the central and at lower
government levels do not interfere with the expansion and in-
creased efficiency of international trade.5 Just as the states in
1787 were required to adjust their use of power to the new reali-
ties of the Federal Constitution,6 the states in 1995 must adjust,
albeit in a more limited way,7 to the requirements of federal par-
ticipation in the international economic system that NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round Agreements represent.
The trade agreements signify the federal government's at-
tempt to realign federalism; in other words, to draw a new divid-
ing line between the powers of the federal government and the
constitutionally-guaranteed powers of the states.8 As this Note
argues, U.S. accession to NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements challenges traditional state powers in the name of
to trade, investment and economic growth worldwide." Peter Behr, Congress to
Cast Vote on Historic Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1994, at Al.
Commentators likewise have characterized NAFTA as a "watershed event"
that signals "an historic turning point" for the United States. JUDITH H. BELLO
ET AL., THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 5 (Judith H. Bello et al.
eds., 1994).
4. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text (discussing agreements
embodied in NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
5. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text (discussing agreements
embodied in NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
6. See generally Merrill Jensen, The Ideal of a National Government Dur-
ing the American Revolution, in EssAYs ON THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrruTION
61-87 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1969) (describing the formulation of a national
government in the post-Revolutionary War period). The Articles of Confedera-
tion, which governed the United States before the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, granted to the central government only weak powers. MERRILL JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, 109 (1940). By
contrast, the Constitution created a strong central government and required
the states to surrender a degree of their sovereignty to that government. Id.
7. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements do not represent a trans-
fer of sovereignty, as did the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Jessica
Matthews, GATT: False Claims, Red Herrings, WASH. PoST, Nov. 28, 1994, at
A25 (asserting that the U.S. has not transferred sovereignty to the WTO). They
provide a more limited expression that the member states intend to set the
terms of competition between them through negotiations among the central
governments. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the con-
tents of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
8. States' rights and the proper line between state and federal power are a
preoccupying interest of the Rehnquist Court. For an account of the Supreme
Court's recent moves in this area, see Robert Pear, Source of State Power is
Pulled From the Ashes, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1995, at A-11, and Richard C.
Ruben, Court Bolsters 10th Amendment, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1995, at 78.
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free international trade in a way that never before has been ac-
complished. This "ratcheting up"9 of federal power remains tem-
pered, however, by powerful constitutional checks on the ability
of the federal government to intrude upon areas of law tradition-
ally reserved to the states.' 0 The agreements, therefore, create
fertile ground for a constitutional conflict.
Using elements of state corporate tax as an example,"- this
Note will demonstrate how the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is useful in overcoming this tension by providing a
basis upon which a private party can attack a state law that con-
flicts with the trade accords. This Note recognizes, however,
that a wholesale invalidation of a state law potentially in conflict
with federal goals is neither politically feasible nor necessarily
9. "Ratcheting up" illustrates the shifting of power that occurs when a
federal body joins or accedes to a supranational organization whose authority
overlaps the authority of the lower levels of government. In doing so, the fed-
eral government passes some degree of its sovereignty or discretion, and, by
implication, the discretion of its constituent governments, to the supranational
body. This necessarily causes a re-drawing of the line between the powers that
the federal government retains and the powers that state governments retain.
Power-sharing between two levels becomes power-sharing at three levels. Such
power-sharing forces states to contend with two higher levels of authority.
With this shifting of power comes a realignment of responsibility between the
federal and state governments. This Note demonstrates that NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements provide excellent examples of this process. Free-
dom to develop a tax system is one state power that federal accession to the
supranational organization transfers, in some degree, to the federal level.
See also GEORGE A. BEwmANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEA
CommNITY LAW 16-19, 46-47 (1993) (noting a continuing debate concerning
"ratcheting up" in the European Union as a result of the Treaty on European
Union).
10. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417, 2434-35
(1992) (finding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from forcing
states to dispose of their own radioactive waste); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct.
2395, 2399-2403 (1991) (holding that state voters have the power to determine
the qualifications of their national representatives); National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 839-40 (1976) (holding that the Commerce Clause does
not grant plenary authority to Congress), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (5-4 decision) (rejecting the
"traditional government function" test that National League of Cities
established).
11. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements may affect many areas of
law traditionally reserved to the states in the same way that they affect state
tax laws. For example, many commentators argue that environmental and la-
bor legislation affect the terms of competition and function as non-tariff barri-
ers to trade. See, e.g., Ursula Kettlewell, GATT - Will Liberalized Trade Aid
Global Environmental Protection?, 21 DENv. J. INT'L L. & Po'Y 55, 56-57
(1992). If these laws vary from state to state, they arguably represent the same
barrier to entry as variable tax systems. See infra notes 117-129 and accompa-
nying text (examining the effect of state tax laws on international trade).
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good policy.12 As a result, in keeping with preemption doctrine
that governs other areas in which federal and state governments
have equally vital, defensible interests, the federal judiciary
must develop a balancing test to help determine when, and if, it
will invalidate a state law in conflict with federal goals embod-
ied in the trade agreements. 13
Part I of this Note explores Supremacy Clause jurispru-
dence, particularly as applied when a state and the federal gov-
ernment have equally defensible, constitutionally explicit
interests at stake. Part II establishes that, because of the trade
agreement obligations and the implementing legislation objec-
tives, state laws that discriminate against foreign parties are
susceptible to a Supremacy Clause challenge. Part III proposes
a set of factors useful in balancing the state and federal interests
involved. This Note concludes that the federal courts should in-
validate state laws only when the disruption to the federal sys-
tem that the state law causes outweighs the state's legitimate
policy concerns.
I. TAXATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution establishes that
the primary authority to conduct international economic rela-
tions lies with the Congress. 14 The President also has the au-
thority, in his own right, to conduct international affairs. 15
States, therefore, cannot participate actively in international af-
fairs and in the regulation of international commerce.
In spite of this check on state power, regulations that states
promulgate in areas traditionally reserved to them increasingly
12. See KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION 1-4, 40-55 (1991)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of an expansive use of the
Supremacy Clause to invalidate state legislation arguably in conflict with fed-
eral laws).
13. See infra notes 135-145 and accompanying text (discussing the imple-
mentation of a judicial balancing test for questionable state laws).
14. "The Congress shall have Power To... regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981) (reading
broadly a statutory authority grant to the President in the area of international
affairs); Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (holding valid several non-binding
export quotas that the Executive negotiated, although the President did not
follow the express legislation in the field, because Congress does not occupy
exclusively the field of international commerce); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (holding that the President is
the nation's representative in the foreign affairs arena).
234 [Vol. 80:231
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
impact international trade because of the ever increasing global-
ization of the U.S. economy.' 6 State corporate income appor-
tionment systems provide one example of such regulations.' 7
With the growth of multinational corporations over the last fifty
years, taxing jurisdictions, including the U.S. states, have strug-
gled to develop income apportionment systems that both mini-
mize double taxation and ensure that each jurisdiction taxes its
fair share of income.' 8 What has emerged is a multitude of dif-
ferent systems among the U.S. states' 9 competing against an in-
ternational system of agreement 2° where one particular method
16. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. direct
investment abroad increased almost one and one-half times from 1980 to 1991.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
811 (1994). U.S. exports rose from $42.7 billion in 1970 to $464.8 billion in
1993, and U.S. imports over the same period increased from $40.0 billion to
$580.5 billion. Id. at 818. In addition, foreign direct investment in the United
States increased almost 500% from 1980 to 1992. Id. at 808.
17. At the root of the conflict lies the states' use of a method of apportioning
income that multinational corporations earn that is wholly different from, and
incompatible with, the system that the rest of the world uses. Recognizing that
the use of varying tax rates and systems in different jurisdictions hampers
trade, national governments have agreed to use one system of income tax ac-
counting, the separate accounting method, by which each government ascer-
tains the income attributable to it. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 (1994) (describing the separate accounting
method that states use); 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN,
STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXEs 8-28 to 8-34 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing generally the separate accounting method); David Greenberg,
Comment, California's Franchise Tax Board: A Bull in the International China
Shop: Barclays Bank International, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, 6 TRANSNAT'L
LAw. 463, 467 (1993) (analyzing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
issue of state taxation of multinational corporations); Elizabeth Harris, Note,
Desperate for Revenue: The States' Unconstitutional Use of the Unitary Method
to Apportion the Taxable Income of Foreign Corporations, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1077, 1078 (1992) (discussing state taxation of multinational corporations).
18. For a summary of tax systems in OECD countries, see generally OR-
GANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CooPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAXATION IN
OECD CouNTRIEs (1993).
19. The states, faced with the rights and obligations of the U.S. federal sys-
tem and the varying demands of their constituencies, have developed tax sys-
tems that differ essentially from the international standard. Harris, supra note
17, at 1079-80. See infra note 20 (discussing the international standard). Us-
ing a system known as formulary apportionment, a state determines what por-
tion of a multinational's income is attributable to it by applying a formula tied
to indicators of the company's economic activity in the state to a measurement
of the company's overall income. See generally HELLERSTEN & HELLERSTEN,
supra note 17, at 8-36 to 8-38 (discussing formulary apportionment); Harris,
supra note 17, at 1080 (discussing formulary apportionment).
20. Separate accounting, used throughout the international system, treats
affiliated members of a business as wholly separate entities for tax accounting
purposes. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Some Perspectives from the GATT Pertain-
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of apportionment was adopted.2 ' This has led to disruption of
ing to Commerce Clause Challenges to State Taxes 20-22 (Oct. 1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review). Members of the
same business must conduct all transactions at "arm's length" through the use
of imputed prices, as though the members deal with unrelated entities. Harris,
supra note 17, at 1078; Greenberg, supra note 17, at 466-67. The separate enti-
ties must maintain accounts based on imputed prices for the goods and services
they "buy" and "sell" with other members of the business. HELLFmSTEIN & H.EL-
LFSTEIN, supra note 17, at 8-28. This treats the separate business as a stand-
alone entity, and allows the company to compute the income attributable to it.
For a case study of the application of imputed prices in the petroleum industry,
see Jean-Thomas Bernard & Robert J. Weiner, Multinational Corporations,
Transfer Prices, and Taxes: Evidence from the U.S. Petroleum Industry, in TAx-
ATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 123 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
The taxing jurisdiction then computes and taxes only the income that di-
rectly is attributable to the members residing within its borders. Harris, supra
note 17, at 1079. See also HE L sTETN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 17, at 8-28
(describing methods commonly used to allocate income through the separate
accounting method). The U.S. government uses the separate accounting
method when it taxes foreign corporations. Harris, supra note 17, at 1079.
21. Interestingly, states originally favored the separate accounting
method. HELLERSTEiN & HELLERSTEiN, supra note 17, at 8-28. States originally
regarded separate accounting as the most precise and accurate method of ap-
portioning income. Id. As multistate and multinational corporations began to
dominate the economy after World War Two, however, criticism of separate ac-
counting mounted. Id. at 8-29. Commentators generally assert that separate
accounting has three defects. First, the accounting required to maintain ade-
quate records of the business transactions that allow the system to work are
complicated and therefore expensive. Id. at 8-29 to 8-30. Second, separate ac-
counting relies on the use of imputed prices, or transfer prices, at which a com-
pany values the transactions that take place between members of the business
family. Id. Reliance on imputed prices requires a comparison of the transac-
tion with one taking place in the open market. Id. Often, however, the neces-
sary data for comparison is absent, and the resultant imputed price is not
accurate. Id. at 8-30 to 8-31. Finally, the separate accounting system ignores
the reality of the business world. Id. at 8-31. Commentators also assert that
there are many fallacies inherent in dividing up a unitary business and treating
each part as equivalent to a separate business. Id. at 8-31 to 8-32. Other com-
mentators argue that the separate accounting method is inferior because it al-
lows corporations to shelter income in states or countries with low tax rates by
using creative accounting techniques. See Harris, supra note 17, at 1079;
Greenberg, supra note 17, at 467.
The states now, however, favor the formulary apportionment method for a
variety of reasons. They argue that it is impossible to separate the income
earned by a multinational corporation in one jurisdiction from that which it
earns in other areas, as is required by the arm's length approach. Harris, supra
note 17, at 1079. The functions performed in various jurisdictions, the states
assert, often are interrelated, and they cannot be accounted for in the manner
required in the international system. Id. In addition, the states believe that
the arm's length method allows corporations to shelter income in jurisdictions
with low tax rates by using accounting techniques that obscure the identity of
the jurisdiction in which the income actually was generated. Id.
Multinational corporations and foreign governments, however, oppose the
use of the formulary apportionment method. See Brief for the Petitioner at 22-
236 [Vol. 80:231
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trade relations22 as U.S. trading partners and multinational cor-
porations protest discriminatory state systems. 23 NAFTA and
28; Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom as amicus curiae Support-
ing Petitioner at 13-24; Brief for Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Or-
ganizations) as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 15-21; Brief of the
Member States of the European Community and the Governments of Australia,
Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland as Amicus
Curiae in support of the petitioner at 4-17, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (Nos. 92-1384, 92-1839).
22. See supra notes 17, 19, 21 and accompanying text (discussing different
tax systems' effects on trade relations).
23. One type of formulary apportionment method, the combined reporting
method, is especially dissatisfactory to international actors. Under this
method, the taxing jurisdiction treats an affiliated business as a unitary group,
and allocates income through the use of an apportionment formula. The gener-
ally-used formula averages the payroll, property, and sales figures of the local
member and compares that figure with the corporation-wide averages to deter-
mine what percentage of business is attributable to activities located in the
state. Harris, supra note 17, at 1080. The taxing jurisdiction then applies this
percentage to a measure of the overall income of the corporation to calculate the
portion of income attributable to the corporation's activities in that state. Id.
This figure is the taxable income for the local activity.
Only four states use this method, which thirteen states once practiced. Id.
at 1080-81. The four states are California, Alaska, North Dakota, and Mon-
tana. See ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.072 (1990); CAL. RaV. & TAX CODE §§ 25120-
25140 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-301, 15-31-305 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-38-12 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
All four states allow the corporation to select the "water's edge" alternative.
HELLEsTE N & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 17, at 8-187; Harris, supra note 17, at
1081. This variant measures income by averaging the property, payroll, and
sales figures, and then compares the averages to income earned in the United
States. Id. at 1081. The world-wide combined reporting (WWCR) method, a
more stringent alternative at issue in Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271-72, formed
the basis for much litigation. This variation of the combined reporting method
compared the average of the three elements of the formula with the global in-
come averages for the corporation. Id.
Although forty-five states use a three-factor formulary apportionment
known as the "Massachusetts formula," the methods by which each state ar-
rives at the pertinent figures differ in each state. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 17, at 9-8 tb. 9-1, 9-23 to 9-25 (describing the states' differing formu-
lary apportionment methods). Moreover, calculation of income earned through
other means, such as real and intangible personal property, differs between
many states. Id. at 9-25 to 9-45.
International actors opposed to the formulary apportionment method argue
that it, and especially its combined reporting variation, overestimates income
attributable to the state. See id. at 8-34 (discussing how this overestimation
can occur). By tying the apportionment formula to indicators such as average
business expenses and sales figures, states skew the income calculation in favor
of high-cost jurisdictions. Id. at 8-74 to 8-75. In addition, because the state
apportionment formulas are not consistent with each other, a multinational do-
ing business in several different U.S. states runs a serious risk of double taxa-
tion on the same income. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-80 (accepting
plaintiff Barclays' assertion that multinational enterprises subjected to the
1995]
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the Uruguay Round Agreements, together with principles of
U.S. law applicable to the trade accords, 24 indicate that the va-
rying state tax systems are susceptible to invalidation because
of federal obligations resulting from the trade accords.25
A. TAX SYsTEMs AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
State income apportionment systems provide insight into a
Supremacy Clause analysis of state laws that conflict with the
trade accords. Historically, plaintiffs challenged these systems
on other grounds. As a result, the Supreme Court has developed
a large body of jurisprudence in the area. 26 More importantly,
because the cases generally deal with foreign trade, the Court's
reasoning, especially in the Commerce Clause area, often al-
ludes to Supremacy Clause concepts. This section will outline
briefly the traditional Commerce Clause challenges to state in-
come apportionment systems, and then develop the elements of
a successful Supremacy Clause action.
1. Traditional Constitutional Treatment of Income
Apportionment Cases
The constitutionality of state income apportionment sys-
tems has divided the states and multinational corporations for
many years.27 Traditionally, a foreign corporation challenged
WWCR system would face a higher risk of double taxation because California
had higher wage, property, and sales costs than other jurisdictions).
Because foreign multinationals conduct a significantly greater portion of
their business in overseas, low-cost areas than do domestic multinationals, the
risk of double taxation for this subgroup of multinationals arguably is even
higher. Id. at 2277 & n.11. Finally, those opposed to formulary apportionment
cite greatly increased costs, because a business must maintain a different ac-
counting system for each U.S. state in which it does business, as well as for the
separate accounting system that the rest of the world uses. Id.
24. With respect to this Note, the relevant principles of U.S. law include
aspects of constitutional law and the implementing legislation that brought the
trade agreements into U.S. law.
25. See infra notes 90-129 and accompanying text (discussing the suscepti-
bility of state tax laws to federal preemption challenges).
26. See generally Barclays, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (discussing a foreign corpora-
tion's challenge of California's income apportionment system); Container Corp.
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (discussing a corporation's
challenge of California's income apportionment system).
27. See, e.g., Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271 (discussing a foreign corporation's
challenge of a state income apportionment system); Colgate Palmolive Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2271 (1994); (discussing a domestic
corporation's challenge of a state income apportionment system); Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 163-65 (discussing a corporation's challenge of a state income
apportionment system). See also California at Bay Over Unitary Tax,
[Vol. 80:231238
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the constitutionality of a state tax system under the Commerce
Clause.28 The Supreme Court, however, in its 1994 decision in
Euromoney Corporate Finance, Feb. 18., 1991, at 47, available in WL, Int-News
database (indicating that "multinationals have been challenging worldwide
combined reporting ever since California started vigorously applying it in the
early 1970s.").
28. See, e.g., Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 3,
13 (1986) (refusing to hold unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce
Clause a Florida fuel tax); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 162-63, 197 (holding
valid under the Commerce Clause the unitary method of taxation as applied to
a domestic multinational corporation); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A-, 441
U.S. 434, 435-36, 454 (1979) (holding unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause a California ad valorem property tax on instrumentalities of foreign
trade); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977) (holding
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause a state tax on the "privilege of
doing business").
When applying the Commerce Clause to state tax systems, the Supreme
Court has balanced the competing interests of free trade with the states' right
to share in the revenue that is earned through such trade. RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, MODERN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 132 (2d ed. 1985). In its latest attempts,
beginning primarily with its decision in Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), the Court has shifted the focus of its jurisprudence from a more formal-
istic analysis of the type of tax at issue, RoTuNDA, supra at 132, to an analysis
of the practical consequences of the state tax in question. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AmicAN CONsTrruTioNAL LAw, § 6-15, at 288-289 (2d ed. 1988).
In Complete Auto Transit, the Court developed a four-part test by which
courts should scrutinize state taxes for Commerce Clause compliance. 430 U.S.
at 279. A state law is permissible under the Complete Auto Transit test if it is
"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State." Id.
The Court extended this test two years later to international commerce
with its decision in Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 436. Japan Line concerned a Cali-
fornia ad valorem tax applied to instrumentalities of international commerce.
Id. at 435-36. The Court held that when international commerce is implicated,
a court must supplement the Complete Auto Transit test with a determination
as to whether the tax results in a substantial risk of international multiple tax-
ation, and whether the tax impairs the ability of the federal government to
speak with one voice. Id. at 451. The petitioners did not argue that the federal
regulation preempted the state law, but the court recognized that, even if the
federal government had not established a sufficient regulatory scheme, the na-
tional interests remain a factor. Id. at 448.
The Container Corp. Court applied its Japan Line decision to a unitary in-
come tax levied on a domestic multinational corporation. 463 U.S. at 185-197.
The Court held that the California law, as applied to a domestic multinational,
met the Japan Line test. Id. at 184. The Court asserted that the instant case
differed from the situation presented in Japan Line in three ways. First,
Container Corp. involved a California income tax, while Japan Line involved a
property tax. Id. at 188 (citing Mobile Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425, 445 (1980)). Second, the Court asserted that, although double taxa-
tion occurred in both cases, unlike the Japan Line situation, the California stat-
ute at issue in Container Corp. did not create inevitable double taxation. Id.
Finally, the incidence of the California income tax in Container Corp. fell on a
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Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California,29 ef-
fectively neutralized this line of attack.30 Barclays argued that
the California income apportionment system violated the Com-
merce Clause because, while all multinationals faced potential
double taxation under the California system, this result is more
likely for foreign-owned multinationals than for domestic mul-
tinationals.31 As a result, Barclays argued, the law unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against foreign multinational
corporations.3 2
In denying Barclays' request to invalidate the law, the
Court asserted that California's system did not produce inevita-
ble double taxation.33 In addition, because Barclays had the
ability to lobby the California legislature, and successfully had
done so, 34 Barclays' assertion that it was not a citizen of Califor-
nia did not entitle it to Federal Commerce Clause protection.3 5
The Court further held that, because the federal government
had not stated sufficiently its preference for an alternate method
of apportionment, the law did not impair the federal govern-
corporation domiciled in the United States rather than on the foreign owners of
an instrumentality of foreign commerce, as in Japan Line. Id. The Court con-
cluded that these differences insured an insubstantial risk of international mul-
tiple taxation and a continued ability on the part of the federal government to
speak with one voice. Id. at 193-97. Nevertheless, the Court specifically re-
served the question of how it would resolve the case if the taxpayer were a
foreign-owned multinational corporation. Id. at 189 n.26. The Court squarely
addressed this issue eleven years later in a challenge to the same California
unitary income tax in Barclays.
29. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
30. The Barclays Court held that, in spite of the challenger's status as a
foreign taxpayer, the California tax did not violate the Complete Auto Transit or
Japan Line requirements. Id. at 2279-81. The Court held that the taxpayer's
factual change from a domestic to a foreign entity did not suffice to change the
Container Corp. outcome. Id. at 2279. Moreover, the Court found it possible,
although concededly less likely, that Barclays would suffer double taxation
under the arm's length approach as well. Id. See supra note 20 (discussing the
arm's length approach).
31. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2280-81.
34. Barclays and numerous other interested parties stridently lobbied the
California legislature and eventually convinced it to modify its corporate tax
code. Id. at 2273. While the industry groups did not convince California to
abandon the unitary method entirely, California did agree to adopt the "water's
edge" alternative. See Harris, supra note 17, at 1096 (discussing the burdens
placed on foreign business concerns by California's tax scheme); Greenberg,
supra note 17, at 467 (discussing Barclays' objection to California's tax scheme).
See also, supra note 23 (describing the "water's edge" alternative approach).
35. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281.
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ment's ability to speak with one voice.3 6 In so deciding, the
Supreme Court virtually removed the Commerce Clause as a
method to protest a seemingly discriminatory state apportion-
ment system.3 7 Barclays arguably closed the door on any fur-
ther use of the Commerce Clause in income apportionment
cases. Nevertheless, traditional Supreme Court Commerce
Clause jurisprudence opens a window to the use of the
Supremacy Clause as a defense against discriminatory appor-
tionment systems.38 Specifically, the Supreme Court recognized
in a variety of cases that state tax laws that discriminate
against foreign-owned interests can compromise the ability of
the federal government to speak with one voice.3 9 This theory,
although developed under challenges based on the Commerce
Clause, is the essence of a Supremacy Clause argument.
Despite these signals, plaintiffs generally have not at-
tempted to base a claim on Supremacy Clause principles. Plain-
tiffs have failed to do so primarily because the Court has
indicated that the current level of federal regulation of state tax
schemes does not create a body of law adequate to meet preemp-
tion requirements. 40 Ironically, Barclays made its way through
the California and federal courts at the same time that the fed-
eral government negotiated and adopted NAFTA and the Uru-
36. Id.
37. Prior cases specifically reserved the fact pattern in Barclays, which in-
volved a foreign-owned multinational that challenged a state tax system that
could result in double taxation. See supra note 28 (noting the Court's reserva-
tion of this issue in Container Corp. of Am. v. California Franchise Tax Bd.).
The Court previously decided and dismissed the claims of domestic multina-
tionals regarding similar laws. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159, 163-65 (1983).
38. This argument may extend only to foreign-owned multinationals be-
cause NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements include concessions be-
tween foreign governments. Domestic multinationals would have more
difficulty arguing successfully that interests that are infringed by another do-
mestic government should be protected because of concessions to foreign coun-
tries' governments that the federal government negotiated.
39. The Court first applied the "one voice" doctrine to a state tax that dis-
criminated against foreign entities in Japan Line v. County of LA., 441 U.S.
434,451 & n.14 (1979). The Court applied the doctrine to a unitary income tax
in Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189-187, and the Court applied the doctrine to a
foreign owner impacted by a unitary income tax in Barclays. 114 S. Ct. at 2279-
86. The plaintiff corporations in these cases did not set forth a Supremacy
Clause challenge, but the Court, concerned about the nature of international
relations and the ability of the federal government to speak with one voice, ad-
ded this preemption-like element to its Commerce Clause analysis.
40. See, e.g., Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7




guay Round Agreements. These agreements, in contrast to the
tax treaties and industry regulation schemes available in previ-
ous cases, do supply an adequate basis on which to argue that
federal law developed pursuant to the trade accords preempts
discriminatory state tax laws.
2. The Elements of a Supremacy Clause Challenge
The Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution
and the federal laws and treaties that flow from it are superior
to state law.4 1 Consequently, when state and federal laws nec-
essarily conflict,42 the Constitution requires courts to follow fed-
eral law and to invalidate the incompatible state rule.43 The
Supreme Court, however, because of strong federalist concerns,
traditionally has hesitated to preempt state laws.44 As a result,
analysis in this field is an imprecise exercise in statutory inter-
pretation.45 In addition, the Court is particularly reluctant to
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Chief Justice Marshall explicitly recognized
the hierarchy of the federal system in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
233-40 (1824).
42. Necessary conflict can mean actual or implicit conflict resulting from
the federal government's determination that only it can legislate in a given
field. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussing preemption and
federalism concepts).
43. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 176-78
(1963) aff'g in part and rev'g in part 368 U.S. 965 (1962).
44. The Court's reluctance stems mainly from the desire to respect the fed-
eral divisions and the system of checks and balances carefully framed in the
Constitution, and in particular, in the Tenth Amendment. TRIBE, supra note
28, § 6-25, at 479-80; STARR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1-4. Compare Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985) (upholding a
federal wage law against a state Commerce Clause challenge) with New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417, 2434-35 (1992) (invalidating a federal ra-
dioactive waste disposal plan on Tenth Amendment grounds).
45. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 6-25, at 480. Federal law provisions that con-
flict directly with state law provisions preempt the state law provisions. See id.,
§ 6-26, at 481-97. For example, if Congress passes a law requiring all states to
use a particular apportionment system, the federal requirement preempts a
state law that does not incorporate this system. A state law can be preempted
as conflicting with federal regulations, however, even if the two are not facially
contradictory. Id. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982),
infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale
in a case involving a state excise tax that hindered a federal objective to en-
courage free trade).
An important caveat to this analysis, however, is that the Court requires
narrow and concrete federal objectives. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 257-58 (1984) (holding that a generalized congressional desire did not
suffice to trigger the preemption doctrine). See also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1532, 1539-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984) (rejecting preemption where Congress failed to evince a clear federal ob-
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act when the federal law requires preemption of a state law in
an area traditionally reserved to the states, such as taxation.46
Recognizing that there is considerable overlap between
them, the Supreme Court requires sufficient evidence of three
elements before it will preempt a law in an area traditionally
reserved to the states.47 First, there must exist a significant and
jective). But see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 184-88 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that federal cigarette labeling requirements preempted a state
tort law), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). Compare Philko Aviation, Inc. v.
Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 407 (1983) (preempting a state law regarding transfers
of airplane titles because Congress intended under the Federal Aviation Act to
create a central clearing house for recording titles) with Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 612, 636-37 (1981) (finding a broadly-declared
congressional purpose to encourage the use of coal insufficient to preempt a
state law applying a coal severance tax).
Additionally, when a complainant challenges a law in an area traditionally
reserved to the states, the courts tolerate a level of tension between the state
and federal schemes in order to preserve important state prerogatives.
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 253-56. In such cases, courts have developed balancing
schemes to determine when a law is valid or invalid under the Supremacy
Clause. Id.
A court also will preempt state law when Congress has chosen to "occupy
the field." See TRmE, supra note 28, at 497-501. The Supreme Court developed
the standard by which it would analyze this concept in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In that case, the Court held that federal
legislation would not oust a state law without "an unambiguous congressional
mandate to that effect." Id. at 147.
When the regulation relates to an area in which the states traditionally
have reserved powers, however, the threshold for federal occupation of the field
is even higher. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's threshold for occupation of a field).
The Court, however, tempers this heightened standard to some degree
when the area traditionally reserved to the states is one in which the federal
government also has a vital interest. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74
(1941). The Hines Court invalidated a state alien registration law, finding fed-
eral regulation of immigration sufficiently encompassing, given the relative im-
portance of the federal and state interests at stake, to allow only federal law to
govern. Id. Significantly, the Hines Court placed higher priority on preserving
the federal power to regulate foreign affairs exclusively than on preserving the
state police power at stake in that case. Id. at 62, 73-74.
46. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing preemption and
federalism); see infra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the Court's reluc-
tance in one particular instance to preempt a state aviation fuel tax where fed-
eral law did not indicate sufficiently a federal intent to displace the state law).
47. See supra note 45 (discussing preemption and federalism). One com-
mentator asserts that the Supreme Court has three categories of preemption.
TRmE, supra note 28, § 6-25, at 481 n.14. These include "express preemption,"
in which Congress has declared specifically its intention to displace state regu-
lation in an area; "implied preemption," in which Congress has "impliedly pre-
cluded" state action as the result of the structure of objectives of federal law;
and "conflict preemption," in which Congress did not explicitly intend to pre-
empt state activities, but the state law conflicts explicitly with the federal law
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well-developed body of federal law.48 For example, the Supreme
Court in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Reve-
nue refused to preempt a state tax on aviation fuel because the
Federal Aviation Act did not create a sufficient body of regula-
tion to warrant preemption. 49 Conversely, in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, the Court declined to preempt a state
tax on coal because a broadly-defined congressional goal to en-
courage the use of coal did not indicate sufficiently that Con-
gress intended to prevent this type of state action.5 °
Next, the plaintiff must prove that the federal government
explicitly or implicitly intended to replace incompatible state
law in light of the federal government's own legislation in the
field. 51 For example, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, the Supreme Court held that federal legislation would not
preempt a state law without "an unambiguous congressional
mandate to that effect."5 2 In addition, if the Court finds that the
state regulation seriously would hamper the realization of clear
federal objectives, it will assume that Congress intended to dis-
place state law in the area, and will preempt the state regula-
tion. In Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, the Supreme Court
preempted a state excise tax because use of the state scheme
would hinder seriously the realization of a clear federal objective
to encourage free trade.53 Furthermore, in Hines v. Davidowitz,
the Court invalidated a state alien registration law, finding fed-
or is "an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives." Id. The com-
mentator, however, does not organize his own analysis around these three cate-
gories, and indicates that they are "anything but analytically air-tight." Id. See
also STARR, supra note 12, at 19-34 (analyzing the Supremacy Clause in three
main categories with numerous subparts). In spite of these various taxonomies,
this Note contends that if a plaintiff can prove the three elements listed above,
it will establish a "prima facie case" of preemption.
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that one element of
preemption involves narrow and concrete federal objectives).
49. 477 U.S. 1, 3, 13 (1986). Compare Philko, 462 U.S. at 407 (preempting
a state law regarding the transfer of airplane titles because the Federal Avia-
tion Act created a well-defined scheme through which Congress intended to es-
tablish nation-wide regulation of the sales of aircraft).
50. 453 U.S. 609, 612, 633-36 (1981).
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that congressional
intent to occupy a field of law is an element of preemption).
52. 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963).
53. 459 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1982). The Court found that the tax on goods
held while awaiting shipment abroad conflicted with Congress's creation of a
series of duty-free areas. Id. at 154. Congress designed the areas in order to
encourage the use of American ports, and although Congress did not prohibit




eral regulation of immigration sufficiently encompassing, given
the relative importance of the federal and state interests at
stake, to allow only federal law to govern.54 The Hines Court
believed that preserving the exclusive federal power to regulate
foreign affairs warranted priority over preserving states' police
power, and that Congress therefore intended to preempt any at-
tempts at state control. 55
However, when the federal regulation concerns an area in
which the states traditionally have reserved powers, such as
taxation, the threshold to prove that Congress intended to dis-
place state law is higher. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the
Court stated that "in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.., we start with the assumption that the historic...
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."5 6
Finally, the state law must be wholly incompatible with the
federal legislative and regulatory scheme.57 Specifically, once a
court determines that the relevant body of federal law in an area
suffices to trigger the Supremacy Clause, and that Congress in-
tended to override existing state regulation in that area, the
court must conduct a case-by-case analysis of each challenged
state law to determine if that law is incompatible with the fed-
eral scheme.58
Courts, however, allow some tension between state and fed-
eral schemes in order to preserve important state prerogatives,
especially in an area traditionally reserved to the states.59 For
example, in Silkwood, the Supreme Court refused to preempt
state tort laws although they arguably conflicted with federal
regulation of nuclear energy facilities.60 The Court found the
state law not so incompatible with the federal scheme so as to
54. 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).
55. Id. at 62, 73-74.
56. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that courts tolerate
some level of tension between state and federal laws).
58. See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 3, 12(1986) (refusing to preempt a state tax on aviation fuel because the federal body
of law in the area did not indicate sufficiently a federal intent to displace the
state legislation).




warrant interference in a field traditionally reserved to state
discretion.61
As these elements demonstrate, at the heart of Supremacy
Clause analysis lies a balancing of state and federal interests.
The court essentially must decide whether the state and federal
regimes can co-exist, which arguably strengthens the role of the
states in the federal system, or whether the federal law must
prevail. The process becomes especially complex and important
when the balance also involves a third, supranational layer
whose interest may be adversely impacted by a field in which
state competence is particularly high. One example includes the
situation in which state tax schemes affect international trade.
If the court favors the federal scheme and preempts the state's
law, it strengthens the federal government at the expense of the
state. It also strengthens a global system that arguably is be-
yond the control of our federalist system.
When courts face such a decision, past Supreme Court juris-
prudence requires them to develop and adhere to a comprehen-
sive balancing method. Such a method must protect state
interests and yet ensure that the federal government retains the
flexibility to meet the nation's goals in the global economy.
The next section, by demonstrating the comprehensive na-
ture of the trade accords, lays the groundwork for two further
points. It first provides the basis on which a Supremacy Clause
challenge of state laws in conflict with the trade accords rests. It
then illustrates how U.S. courts can work within the system to
appropriately balance competing state, federal, and global
interests.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTs
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements do not have
direct force in U.S. law. Instead, they require a separate law to
bring them into effect.6 2 Thus, an analysis of their significance
must examine not only the terms of the agreements themselves,
61. Id. at 256-58. See also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529,
1539-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act did not preempt a state's ability to regulate pesticide manufac-
turing and labeling). But see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
184-88 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that federal cigarette labeling requirements pre-
empted state tort law).
62. See generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 96 AM. J. Ir'L L. 310 (1992) (reviewing the domes-
tic legal effect and implementation of international agreements in U.S. law).
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but also the terms of the implementation acts that brought them
into U.S. law.
1. The Trade Accords
NAFTA63 and the Uruguay Round Agreements 64 represent
the federal government's intention to bind the United States to
the terms of competition that it negotiates with foreign govern-
63. The North American Free Trade Agreement is an extensive and com-
prehensive arrangement designed to liberalize reciprocally and to open U.S.,
Canadian, and Mexican markets. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), supra note 1, at 8,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2558-59. The member countries intended
NAFTA to be the sole framework through which the members continue to de-
velop their future trade relations. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
8 and 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 102, para. 1(b), (c), (f) reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
289; 32 I.L.M. 605. [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 102, which lays out the objec-
tives of NAFTA, states that the agreement seeks to promote conditions of fair
competition, to increase substantially the investment opportunities available in
the territories of the parties, and most importantly to establish a framework for
further cooperation designed to expand and enhance the benefits of the agree-
ment. Id.
Under the auspices of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, NAFTA establishes a
free trade area with common external tariffs and eliminates duties and other
restrictive regulations on a substantial portion of the trade between member
countries. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2559.
NAFTA itself contains eight parts, covering trade in goods; technical barri-
ers to trade; government procurement; investment, services and related mat-
ters; intellectual property; administration; and exceptions to the agreement.
NAFTA, pts. 2-8; see also BELLO ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-7 (describing the
provisions of NAFTA). Following the successful Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, NAFTA extends the tariff reductions achieved in that agreement to
the Mexican market. Id. at 5. NAFTA also opens and liberalizes trade in serv-
ices between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Id. To ensure that surges in im-
ports do not lead governments to undermine the provisions of the agreement,
NAFTA contains bilateral, multilateral, general, and product-specific safeguard
measures. Id. at 6. NAFTA also contains a chapter outlining treatment of, and
protection for, intellectual property rights in the three Member States.
NAFTA, supra ch. 16. Finally, NAFTA contains chapters detailing anti-dump-
ing and countervailing duty measures, id. ch. 19, rules of origin requirements,
id. ch. 4, investment rules, id. ch. 12, and competition policy. Id. ch. 15.
NAFTA also implements an extensive dispute resolution mechanism that
provides for adjudication of disputes arising from the application of the agree-
ment. Id. arts. 2001-22. This provision is significant because a member's com-
pliance demonstrates a willingness not only to agree to an encompassing
structure of arrangements, but also to be judged and bound by extranational
authorities. Significantly, NAFTA Chapter 20 (dispute resolution) refers only
to "Parties" to the agreement. Id. ch. 20. Although NAFTA does not specifically
define "Parties," its preamble indicates that the agreement is between the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America, Canada, and the United States of
Mexico. Id. pmbl. Specifying the treaty along these national government lines,
NAFTA effectively nullifies a state's right to represent itself and incorporates
the state's interests into the national or federal interest.
1995]
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ments.65 The global trading system, as defined by NAFTA and
64. The Uruguay Round Agreements intend to encompass virtually all of
the United States' trading partners, and 111 countries, including the United
States, signed them. H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3782. As with NAFTA, the purpose of the Agreements is
to "provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade rela-
tions among its Members." Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Apr. 15, 1994, art. H, para. 1, in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
1327 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]. Additionally, the agreements intend to estab-
lish "the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilat-
eral trade relations." Id. art. I, para. 2.
Three treaties form the bulk of the Uruguay Round Agreements. GATT
1994 is a code of rules applying to government action, and a series of tariff
bindings that regulate international trade in goods. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMc RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIc RELATIONS 278 (Draft 3d ed. 1994). Its basic purpose is to restrain
governments from imposing or continuing to impose various measures that dis-
tort or restrict international trade. Id.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers such sectors as
tourism, banking, communications, medical, legal, insurance, brokerage, and
transport. Id. GATS uses analogies to GATT rules to regulate these services.
Id. at 279. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) provides rules requiring governments to ensure a certain mini-
mum level of protection for patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks,
business secrets, and similar matters. Id.
The Uruguay Round Agreements also contain mandatory dispute settle-
ment rules that allow an aggrieved government to rescind negotiated conces-
sions automatically when a dispute resolution panel has adjudicated a case in
its favor. Understanding of Rules and Procedures Concerning the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 22, para. 6, in H.R. Doc. No. 316, at 1654 [herein-
after DSU]. As with NAFTA, only national governments (to be precise, sepa-
rate customs territories) may be represented in the WTO dispute settlement
system, even if the conflict involves a constituent government's law. Id. art. 2,
para. 1. Finally, each agreement has exceptions to the general rules laid out
above that allow nations to adopt inconsistent legislation when necessary to
promote public health, national security, and other delineated items. See Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XX [hereinafter
GATT 1994]; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, pt. II, art.
XIV, in H.R. Doc. No. 316, at 1586 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
65. U.S. states, by the terms of NAFTA, the Uruguay Round Agreements,
and the U.S. Constitution, cannot act independently of the federal government
in areas that the trade agreements cover. The WTO, for instance, indicates
that any "State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations... may accede to this Agreement
.... " WTO, supra note 64, art. XII. See also NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 2204.
The U.S. Constitution, furthermore, grants to Congress primary authority
in international economic affairs. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. The Constitution,
however, requires Congress to share this power with the Executive Branch, and
it allows Congress to delegate all implementation powers to the Executive
Branch. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reviewing caselaw that indi-
cates that Congress's power in the field of international commerce is not exclu-
sive). As a result, only the federal government may set and negotiate the terms
of competition of international trade. States, on the other hand, are not mem-
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the Uruguay Round Agreements, bases itself on presumably
equal concessions granted between trading partners that are
designed to expand and improve trade.66 To accomplish this,
the two trade accords rely on several main premises. First,
members will negotiate the conditions governing international
trade.67 The accords further require members to prevent inter-
nal non-tariff barriers from negating the value of the negotiated
concessions. 68 Two clauses enforce and protect these important
pillars of the agreements. The Most Favored Nation (MFN)
clauses 69 state that when a member grants any advantage to
another member it must grant the same advantage to the like
products of every other member "immediately and uncondition-
ally."70 The National Treatment clauses71 require members to
hers of trade agreements and do not have the authority under U.S. law to con-
duct external relations. Thus, state acts that impact the negotiated trade
agreement terms arguably are unconstitutional.
66. JACKSON Er AL., supra note 64, at 335.
67. See United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub-
stances, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987) (Can., E.E.C. & Mex. v. U.S.), para.
5.1.9., reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments & Selected Documents 136 (34th
Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub-
stances]. Although the cited GATT jurisprudence does not have specific prece-
dential value for NAFTA or WTO dispute resolution panels, JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 64, at 335, past GATT panel decisions will influence heavily both the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA. The new trade agreements specifically have in-
corporated elements of GATT 1947 and because GATT panel decisions repre-
sent the most complete, and thus the most influential, body of interpretation of
international agreements available in the trade and commercial setting. Id.
68. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the policies of
the various trade agreements on the issues of national treatment and Most Fa-
vored Nation clauses); Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
supra note 67, para. 5.1.9; United States - § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT.
Doc. L16439 (Nov. 7, 1989), para. 5.10, GATT, Basic Instruments & Selected
Documents (34th Supp. 1988).
69. NAFTA does not contain one provision dealing solely with MFN, but it
includes MFN clauses in various portions of the agreement. See, e.g., NAFTA,
supra note 63, arts. 308, 1003, 1103, 1203, 1406, 1703 (requiring Most Favored
Nation treatment for rates of duty on certain goods, in government procure-
ment, for investors and investments, for cross-border trade in services, and for
financial services). However, NAFTA provides for exceptions to these MFN re-
quirements. See, e.g., id., Annex IV: Schedule of the United States (claiming
exceptions to Article 1103 for aviation, fisheries, maritime matters, and tele-
communications). The Uruguay Round Agreements contain an MFN clause
that generally is applicable, unless otherwise noted, to all parts of the agree-
ments. GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. L
70. The actual language in the current GAIT agreement states:
[W]ith respect to customs duties and charges ... [the] method of levy-
ing such duties and charges ... and with respect to all rules and for-
malities in connection with importation and exportation, and with
respect to all matters referred to in [the National Treatment Clause],
any advantage.., granted by any [GATT member] to any product
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apply the same internal taxes, charges, and regulations to im-
ported products as they would to their own like domestic
products.72
Moreover, the Uruguay Round Agreements and NAFTA
oblige state and provincial governments to conform to the agree-
ments.73 Both agreements direct central governments to take
reasonable action to enforce the international obligations at
originating in any [other GATT member] shall be accorded immedi-
ately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other [GATT members].
GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. I.
71. NAFTA does not have one consolidated National Treatment provision.
Rather, it contains clauses in the various separate portions of the Agreement.
For example, Article 301 spells out national treatment for trade in goods.
NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 301. The article states that "[e]ach party shall ac-
cord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance with Article
IH of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Id. para. 1. In
addition, Article 301 defines national treatment "with respect to a state or prov-
ince [as] treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment ac-
corded by such state or province to any like, directly competitive or
substitutable goods..." Id. para. 2.
Chapter 11 deals with investment. Its National Treatment section requires
that "[elach party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, op-
eration, and sale or other disposition of investments." Id. art. 1102. Section 2
of Article 1102 extends national treatment to the investments themselves, and
section 3 indicates that, for state and provincial governments, "national treat-
ment" means treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment
accorded by the state or provincial government to that party's investors or in-
vestments. Id. § 2.
"National treatment" thus requires that state governments not treat in-
vestments owned by foreigners less favorably than investments owned by a
state citizen. This implies that state tax systems violate the agreement if they
cause foreign-owned multinationals more likely to face double taxation than
multinationals registered in that state.
However, all three NAFTA members have taken exception to the National
Treatment provisions. Id. Annex VII, § A (claiming reservations to national
treatment for several areas pertaining to the financial services portion of
NAFTA).
72. The actual text of the GATT 1994 article pertaining to national treat-
ment with respect to internal taxes states:
The products.., of any [GATT member] imported directly into ... any
other [GATT member] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to in-
ternal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in [the Most Favorable Nation clause].
GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. I, para. 2.
73. NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 105; GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. XXIV,
para. 12.
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lower government levels.74 If the central government cannot
succeed in securing state conformity, the agreements authorize
retaliation by aggrieved trading partners.7 5
Especially significant are the pacts within NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements relating to trade in services and in-
vestment.76 For the first time, the federal government has nego-
tiated arrangements designed to regulate international trade in
services and investment.77 As a result, areas such as banking,
74. NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 105; GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. XXIV,
para. 12.
75. NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 2019; DSU, supra note 64, art. 22, para. 6.
76. See GATS, supra note 64; NAFTA, supra note 63, pt. 5. GATT did not
consider income taxes to be taxes on products. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 64,
at 511. Therefore, Article III of GATT did not cover discriminatory income
taxes. Past commercial practices primarily are responsible for this inconsis-
tency. See KENT HIGGON HuGHEs, TRADE, TAXES, AND TRANSNATIONALS: INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING IN CONGRESS 88 (1979). Traditional
economic principles assume that, in a competitive situation, the profit-maximiz-
ing firm will bear the burden of the corporate income tax in the short run. Id.
In the long run, however, some portion of the tax probably will shift back to
labor. Id. If the markets are imperfect, it is likely that the consumer will ab-
sorb the tax by paying higher prices. Id. As a result, the income tax acts like a
direct tax. Id. Early agreement at the GATT allowed parties to rebate indirect
taxes, but not direct taxes. Id. Moreover, because only goods crossed borders,
the earlier GATT agreement did not address the larger questions of discrimina-
tory income taxes.
Arguably, with the extension of the international trade regime to services
and investments, this should be changed. GATT established the existing rule
primarily to control disguised subsidies to exports and non-tariff barriers to im-
ports by rebating taxes on exports and imposing taxes on imports. Id. Since
only goods entered and left countries, the problem of a discriminatory income
tax levied directly on a business entity was not an issue. Any levied tax had to
be on the product and had to be nondiscriminatory. GATT 1994, supra note 64,
art. Ill, para. 2. The established rule prevents states from imposing discrimina-
tory income taxes on imports. Since service providers and investors now will
cross borders with increased ease, GAT'Ps concept of non-violation nullification
and impairment may indicate that discriminatory income taxes, such as the
unitary tax and the checkerboard tax systems of U.S. states, violate GATS and
NAFTA. See Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, supra note
67, para. 5.1.3. (discussing the GATT concept of non-violation nullification and
impairment).
77. Annex I(A) of the Uruguay Round Agreements is the Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Goods. It consists of the text of the 1947 GATT, incorpo-
rated by reference, and a series of protocols and understandings adopted during
the various rounds of negotiation. GATT 1994, supra note 64, Annex I(A). The
Uruguay Round Agreements, however, do not contain merely an agreement on
trade in goods, as did the 1947 GATT. They also contain agreements on trade
in services, id. Annex I(B), on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, id. Annex I(C), a dispute settlement understanding, id. Annex H, a trade
policy review mechanism, id. Annex HI, and a series of plurilateral agreements.
Id. Annex IV.
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investment services, tourism, and insurance, traditionally sub-
ject primarily to state regulation, now fall under the federally-
mandated trade regulations.78
Finally, both agreements contain elaborate dispute settle-
ment understandings that remove the settlement of conflicts
from diplomatic and national judicial arenas. 79 This demon-
strates a member's willingness not only to agree to an all-encom-
passing structure of arrangements, but also a willingness to be
judged by extranational authorities. A dispute panel decision
has no binding precedence in U.S. law, and a state law is not
"preempted" by an adverse finding.80 If the responsible govern-
ment does not change the offending law, however, the aggrieved
trading partner has the right to retaliate as governed by the dis-
pute resolution agreements. 8 ' Moreover, even if the infraction
is the result of a state or local government's law, only the na-
tional government is represented at the dispute panel.8 2
2. The Implementing Legislation in the United States
Congress adopted two similar pieces of legislation to bring
the Uruguay Round Agreements 83 and NAFTA8 4 into U.S. law.
Both pieces of legislation approve the agreements themselves,
and both make necessary changes to federal law to meet the ob-
ligations of the trade accords.8 5 In addition, the implementation
acts spell out the relationship of the trade agreements to federal,
state, and local law.8 6 Section 102 of each of the acts is the most
significant to a Supremacy Clause argument. These sections re-
quire the President of the United States to work toward achiev-
ing conformity of state laws with the requirements of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements, and they establish a con-
sultation procedure designed to enhance cooperation between
78. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements contain significant excep-
tions to the requirements for national treatment and most favored nation sta-
tus in these areas. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (detailing
these exceptions).
79. NAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20; DSU, supra note 64, art. 22, para. 6.
80. Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2, § 102(c)(2)(A); NAFTA Act, supra
note 1, § 102(b)(2).
81. DSU, supra note 64, art. 22; NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 2019.
82. DSU, supra note 64, art. 2, para. 1 (speciIying that only "members" may
be present at dispute proceedings); NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 20.
83. See Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2.
84. See NAFTA Act, supra note 1.
85. Id. § 101; Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2, § 101.
86. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102(a), (b); Uruguay Round Act, supra note
2, § 102(a), (b).
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the state governments and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative.8 7 Section 102 also denies private causes of ac-
tion, 8 and it denies the states a role in the international dispute
settlement systems established by the trade agreements.8 9
II. PREEMPTING STATE TRADE BARRIERS
Part I established that a plaintiff must establish three ele-
ments to prosecute successfully a Supremacy Clause challenge
to state law. This section demonstrates why state tax laws that
function as barriers to trade by discriminating against foreign
enterprises are vulnerable to a preemption challenge under the
new trade regime. Many observers believe that state apportion-
ment systems are a barrier to trade.90 As a result, these sys-
tems form the backdrop for this analysis.
A. A BODY OF LAw EXPRESSING NARRow GOALS
Preemption doctrine requires that a significant body of fed-
eral law narrowly express federal goals before a court will pre-
empt state laws in an area traditionally reserved to the states.91
By approving NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements and
integrating them into U.S. law through implementing legisla-
tion, the federal government has developed the necessary scope
of regulation to satisfy this element of Supremacy Clause analy-
sis. 92 Specifically, the body of regulation flowing from NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements expresses two narrow
goals.
87. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102(a), (b); Uruguay Round Act, supra note
2, § 102(a), (b).
88. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102(c); Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2,
§ 102(b)(1)(B), (C).
89. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102(a), (b); Uruguay Round Act, supra note
2, § 102(a), (b).
90. See supra notes 17, 19, 21 and accompanying text (noting that the
states' use of the formulary apportionment system is incompatible with the sep-
arate accounting method of apportionment that the national governments
agreed to use).
91. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that the Court has
held that federal law preempts state law only when the state impeded a federal
objective expressed through clear and well-developed federal regulations).
92. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
government's extensive obligations under NAFTA and GATT and the resulting
federal laws passed in order to meet those obligations).
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1. Favoring Process Over Substance: The Trade Accords
Create a Set of Rules and Define the Players
Acting within its authority to regulate foreign commerce, 93
the federal government bound the nation to the rules contained
in the trade accords. 94 In doing so, the federal government re-
served to itself exclusively the right to negotiate and adjudicate
the terms of international competition. More important than
the actual rules established by the trade agreements is the codi-
fication of a process by which members agree to address virtu-
ally every aspect of international trade.95 The federal
government always has had significant rules and treaties in
place to govern foreign economic relations.9 6 The trade accords,
however, extend GATT 1947's process-oriented approach 97 to
most sectors of the world economy. Although the new service
and investment agreements leave much to future negotiation,
the World Trade Organization's 98 (WTO) procedures and prefer-
ences99 bind the contracting parties in their regulation of these
areas of trade. Significantly, the trade accords reserve to the na-
93. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting Congress's constitu-
tional grant of authority to conduct international economic relations).
94. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text (noting that Congress
passed the NAFTA Implementation Act and the Uruguay Round Act, which
both approve the agreements and make the necessary changes in federal law).
95. See supra notes 3, 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the exten-
sive scope of the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements' provisions that
seek to increase worldwide economic growth).
96. For example, Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1300
(1988), is the basic U.S. antidumping law. The U.S. also has established com-
prehensive control of exports through the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (1991 & Supp. 1995). Of course, GATT 1947 regulated trade
in goods, but it was not explicitly part of U.S. law. See infra note 101 (noting
that GATT 1947 never was adopted into U.S. law). The United States also en-
ters into numerous tax treaties and bilateral trade treaties. See, e.g., Conven-
tion Between United States and United Kingdom for Avoidance of Double
Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5687. Two recent cases liti-
gating the validity of states' tax apportionment systems concerned this treaty.
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2284
(1994); In re Reuters Ltd. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 623 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 (N.Y.
1993).
97. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 124.
98. The WTO is the organization created by the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments to administer the Agreements themselves. See supra note 64 and accom-
panying text (describing the establishment of the WTO).
99. These procedures and preferences primarily include a preference for
tariffs, requirements to limit internal regulation, and multilateral negotiations
to secure conceptually-equal concessions for all contracting parties. See supra




tional government the right to participate in the trade
negotiations.100
This change from regulation of substance to regulation of
process 1 indicates that the federal government has exclusive
control over the terms of competition in foreign trade. If the fed-
eral government set only substantive rules, the preemption doc-
trine would tolerate state rules in areas that the federal scheme
does not cover explicitly. 0 2 Because the federal system estab-
lishes a process for developing rules in which the states cannot
participate directly, however, there is no room for state action
affecting the terms of competition that result from the negotia-
tion. As a result, any state law that disturbs the federal terms
of competition by either offering additional assistance or erect-
ing increased barriers violates the federal government's ex-
pressed prerogatives.
2. Expansion of International Trade
The structure and depth of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements demonstrate first the federal government's strong
commitment to liberalize and strengthen international trade,
and second, that the federal government intended to meet this
commitment through the structure of the trade agreements. 103
Congress recognized, for instance, that NAFTA "provides a solid
framework for the liberalization of trade barriers throughout the
Western Hemisphere.... [and] should also provide the catalyst
100. The implementing legislation for both trade accords allows for exten-
sive cooperation and consultation between the federal and state governments,
but the consultations do not bind the federal government. See supra notes 83-
89 and accompanying text (describing the accords and the relationship between
the federal and state governments outlined in them).
101. Although GATT 1947 also established procedures that obligated the
United States to negotiate concessions with other GAT members, GATT 1947
never was officially "adopted" into U.S. law, JACKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at
306, and it remained limited to trade in goods. See supra note 77 (discussing
the GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 differences). See also JACKSON ET AL., supra
note 64, at 849 (noting that GATT 1947 did not cover trade in services).
102. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (observing that the Court
has refused to preempt a state law when a federal regulation in a particular
area either did not indicate sufficiently a federal intent to preempt or did not
impair completely the state law).
103. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), supra note 2, at 16, reprinted in 1994
U.S.O.C.A.N. at 3788 (discussing the benefits of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments); H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), supra note 1, at 8-9, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2558-59 (discussing the benefits of NAFTA).
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for negotiations to liberalize trade barriers on a multilateral
basis."104
The federal government viewed the trade accords as a
method through which U.S. trade would expand.10 5 Congress
stated that "NAFTA will enable the United States to take ad-
vantage of U.S. economic strengths and remain the world's big-
gest and best exporter."10 6 In addition, NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements include rules and processes
designed to liberalize and expand international trade in govern-
ment procurement and services. 10 7 Although the agreements al-
low nations to reserve exceptions in the newly-added sectors,108
the trade accord members' inclusion of these areas in the formal
negotiating process signifies a desire to expand trade by putting
previously undiscussed topics on the table. Consequently, any
state law that explicitly or implicitly works to reduce trade vio-
lates clearly-expressed federal goals.
B. INTENT TO PREEMPT
Preemption doctrine next requires the complainant to es-
tablish that the federal government intended to preempt state
authority. In creating this significant and comprehensive body
of law to govern international trade, the federal government in-
tended to supersede inconsistent state laws.' 0 9 The federal gov-
ernment established this intention in several ways. First, the
federal government's accession to a negotiating system that gen-
erally is limited to national-level governments demonstrates its
intention to rule out state activity.110




107. See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussing the provi-
sions of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements).
108. See JACKSON Er AL., supra note 64, at 278-79 (stating that GATS provi-
sions regarding new subjects contained exceptions similar to those included in
GATT).
109. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption
of federal intent to preempt state law when state law hinders the realization of
a clear federal objective). Interestingly, this element also is required under
Commerce Clause "one voice" analysis, and plaintiffs seldom could meet it. See
supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
110. See supra notes 77, 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the exclu-




The NAFTA Implementation Act, furthermore, explicitly
recognizes that states must change any law inconsistent with
NAFTA. The Act directs the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
to assist the states in identifying laws that may not conform to
the agreement.111 The Act also charges the USTR with estab-
lishing a process by which it will address issues relating to the
agreement that will have, or could have, a direct impact on the
states. 112
The legislative history of the NAFTA Implementation Act
paints an even clearer picture. In the House of Representatives
Report that accompanied the NAFTA Implementation Act, Con-
gress explicitly asserted that "the Agreement prevails over in-
consistent State or local law"' 13 and indicated that NAFTA
obligations apply to state and local governments, as well as to
the federal government. 114
The Uruguay Round Implementation Act contains similar
language. Like the NAFTA Implementation Act, it requires con-
sultation between the USTR and the states to achieve state con-
fortuity with the Agreements. 1 5 Finally, in the House Report
prepared pursuant to the passage of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Implementation Act, Congress indicated that it clearly
understood and intended that the terms of the trade accord
would preempt incompatible state law. In particular, Congress
stated that the "President shall consult with the States ... to
achieve conformity of state law and practices with the
agreements."31 6
111. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, at § 102(b)(1)(B).
112. Id.
113. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(1), supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C-A.N. at 2553.
114. "NAFTA obligations generally apply to State and local, as well as Fed-
eral, laws and regulations .... " Id. at 14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C-AN. at
2528. The text of a letter from the United States Trade Representative to Rep-
resentative Henry Waxman indicates congressional awareness that obligations
resulting from NAFTA may preempt state and local laws. Id. at 169, reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2899. Specifically, the letter indicates United States
Trade Representative Michael Kantor's desire that "the language of the draft
NAFTA implementing bill ... not unnecessarily interfere with state and local
laws." Id.
115. Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2, § 102(b)(1)(B).




C. INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL
SYSTEMS
Finally, preemption doctrine also requires that a particular
state law be clearly incompatible with the federal system before
the court may invalidate it, even when the federal law provides
for preemption.11 7 The following analysis applies preemption
doctrine to state tax systems to demonstrate how a state law
potentially is incompatible with the federal trading system.
1. Effect of State Tax Laws on the Exclusive Federal Right to
Set Terms of Competition
State tax laws and other internal regulatory measures af-
fect the profitability of doing business in a jurisdiction, and, con-
sequently, they are factors in a company's decision to conduct
business in a particular location.118 Against this backdrop of ex-
isting internal regulations, the United States negotiates
through the trade accords to define the terms of competition and
to give trade partners additional access to U.S. markets in re-
turn for theoretically equal concessions.'1 9 State laws that dif-
fer from the structure presumed by the federal government in
its negotiations change the resulting terms of competition, 20
thereby disrupting the balance of negotiated concessions that
the federal government and the trade accord system strive to
achieve.
For example, the federal government may agree to ease es-
tablishment requirements governing the ability of foreigners to
open banks in the United States. In return, the United States
would receive more favorable trading conditions from other
trade agreement members. If a state subsequently taxes foreign
banks at a higher rate than it taxes domestic banks, however,
foreign banks that wish to establish in that state may view the
concession as less valuable than the federal government in-
tended it to be. As a result, the state law erodes the value of the
concessions granted by the federal government, and changes the
117. See supra notes 45, 57-58 and accompanying text (noting that courts
often tolerate some tension between state and federal laws).
118. See ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TAXATION IN OECD CouNTRIEs 49 (1993).
119. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (noting that both NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements are premised on trade accord members'
granting of concessions).
120. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text (discussing the federal




terms of competition negotiated through the trade accords. This
state action violates the exclusive right of the federal govern-
ment to set international competitive parameters. 121
2. Effect on the Federal Goal of Expanding Trade
Differing income tax rates hamper trade by acting as a bar-
rier to entry and by suppressing overall return to capital in the
economy. 122 If state tax rates differ from each other or from the
rates set by the federal government, the state has violated di-
rectly the federal government's goal of expanding trade.12 3
Specifically, in a competitive market, the net return to capi-
tal invested in different sectors will be equal. 124 If the return is
higher in one sector than another, investors will shift their capi-
tal to that sector, driving down the rate of return in the high-
return area. 125 This process will continue until the returns
again are equal between the sectors. 126
Traditional economic analysis demonstrates the impact of a
discriminatory tax across competing sectors.' 2 7 In the absence
of a tax, and holding all else equal, assume that the rates of re-
turn for domestic and foreign investors in State A and State B
are both 8%. If State A introduces a 50% income tax charged
only to foreign investors, while State B makes no change in its
tax, the immediate or short-run effect is to drop the yield for
121. This type of tax also would violate federally-accepted substantive rules
of the trade accords. See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussing
the binding provisions of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements). Both
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements require that national treatment
be accorded to foreign investors and their investments. States' taxation of for-
eign banks at higher rates would violate this provision. Moreover, state tax
laws that differ from the federal government's presumed norms violate WTO
economic transparency requirements. The Uruguay Round Agreements and
NAFTA are premised on the idea that trading partners can predict the result
that will obtain from a concession they grant or receive. Varying state laws
disrupt the partners' ability to predict the economic effect. The Agreements im-
plicitly recognize this outcome in the clauses requiring state conformity. See
supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the MFN clauses and Na-
tional Treatment clauses that require the equalization of internal taxes,
charges, and regulations among members).
122. EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE
AND THE PRICE SYSTEm 369-74 (1987).
123. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing the strong
U.S. commitment to expansion of trade through negotiated concessions that are
vulnerable to internal regulation).






foreign owners in State A to only 4%. As a result, foreign inves-
tors have an incentive to shift capital away from State A to State
B, where they can earn a higher rate of return. As the foreign
capital moves away from State A, the rate of return in State A
increases, while the return in State B decreases. This process
continues until the rates of return again are equal in both
states.
Assume equilibrium is reached at 6%. Because of the tax
and the reduction in available capital, the before-tax rate of re-
turn in State A now must be 12%. Investors, however, may only
keep 6%. They therefore receive a 25% lower return (from 8% to
6%) than they received before the income tax change.
Unfortunately, return on investment in State B also is 25%
lower, even though the tax does not apply to investments in that
state. This lower return is a result of the flight of capital from
State A. 128 Basic supply and demand analysis indicates that,
because capital is more available, the cost of employing it will go
down. The decreased rates of return further indicate that in-
vestment in both states also will decrease as investors look else-
where for higher rates of return.
This analysis suggests that when income taxes between
competitive jurisdictions differ, investment in general, not just
investment in the taxing jurisdiction, will decrease. As a result,
if a government wishes to pursue a policy of increased invest-
ment, it should attempt to stabilize tax rates across competitive
jurisdictions. 129 In other words, if the U.S. government wishes
to increase and liberalize international trade and investment, it
must ensure that variations in state tax rates do not erode the
rate of return available to foreign investors. The government
can do this by attempting to equalize the tax rate applied to all
investors in all states. If states' tax rates differ from state to
state and between the states and the federal government, the
above analysis indicates that the U.S. will be less competitive,
as it will offer a lower rate of return on capital investment than
will a country with a more uniform rate of income taxation.
State tax systems that do, in fact, differ from the federal system





M. A NEW BALANCING: READJUSTING SUPREMACY
CLAUSE ANALYSIS FOR A THREE-TIERED
STRUCTURE
If the United States is to retain its position as a world
leader in advocating free trade, it must demonstrate that the
federal government can achieve state conformity with federal
trade positions. Equally important, however, is the need to en-
sure that the cost of conformity does not outweigh the benefits,
and that the line between state and federal power is redrawn
carefully and thoughtfully.
When the right of the federal government to regulate inter-
nal affairs or commerce conflicts with a state's right to exercise
its tax or police power, the judiciary traditionally has sought to
balance the needs of both sides. In the process, the judiciary has
recognized the inevitable tension between the overlapping pow-
ers.130 The scope of the trade accords ensures that the federal
government's right to establish international trade regulations
will overlap with states' traditional rights to tax, and to regulate
labor, the environment, health and welfare, and many other ar-
eas. The tension between the federal and state schemes also af-
fects individual rights and one's ability to conduct business
profitably. As a result, individuals have a great interest in
prompt and certain resolution of perceived incompatibility be-
tween state and federal laws.
Clear language in the trade agreements requires state gov-
ernments to adjust incompatible state laws. 13 1 However, the
agreements cannot form the basis of a suit by a private party to
challenge a state law because the implementing legislation that
brought the agreements into U.S. law specifically denies parties
a private right of action.132 Instead, if a private party wishes to
invoke the requirements contained in the trade agreements, it
either must rely on federal government action 33 or attempt to
130. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussing the elements
of a Supremacy Clause challenge).
131. NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 105; GATT 1994, supra note 64, art. XXIV,
para. 12.
132. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102; Uruguay Round Act, supra note 2,
§ 102. Moreover, the same sections of the Inplementation Acts deny a private
right of action that would require the federal government to take action against
a recalcitrant state. NAFTA Act, supra note 1, § 102; Uruguay Round Act,
supra note 2, § 102.
133. For example, the Statement of Administrative Action for the NAFTA
Act indicates that the Act requires close cooperation between the federal and
state governments to identify incompatible state laws, to grandfather the laws
when possible, and to cooperate to resolve the differences when grandfathering
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find a separate basis for a suit under another principle of U.S.
law.
Recourse to the political solution embodied by federal gov-
ernment action most likely will result in a political answer.
That is, an answer that is not reached by an impartial body act-
ing according to a set of principles, but one that instead is influ-
enced by the bargaining and gamesmanship inherent in the
political arena. While a political solution may have its advan-
tages, parties that are impacted adversely by state laws in con-
flict with the federally-adopted trade accords must have
recourse to the court system to challenge those laws.13
4
Traditional Supremacy Clause analysis is designed to re-
solve conflicts between two levels of decision-makers whose com-
petition is further restrained by a well-developed system of
checks and balances. Conflicts that result from federal attempts
to pass rulemaking discretion to a supranational body that is not
required to live within the same rules call for a new, more de-
tailed approach to balancing the interests involved. Hence, in
addition to the traditional analysis to which a Supremacy
Clause challenge is subjected, courts faced with a challenge in-
volving a level of authority outside the federalist system must
ask whether the benefit of passing that discretion to the supra-
national body is worth the cost to federalism as a whole. Courts
should analyze potentially-conflicting laws on a case-by-case ba-
sis and invalidate only the most disruptive laws. Courts should
not invalidate state laws that vary only minimally from federal
norms, or that are unlikely to result in retaliation, even though
the laws result in discriminatory or otherwise violative treat-
ment of foreign parties.' 3 5
is not possible. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
Statement of Administrative Action 12, reprinted in 1 NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXT OF AGREEmENTs, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF
ADMINSTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 457-61
(1993).
134. The Constitution, through the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees citizens the right to con-
duct business without discriminatory interference by or among the states. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV. While political action creates a
viable alternative that may provide an avenue for aggrieved citizens, access to
the courts to protest an unconstitutional law is not annulled simply because
political action aimed at changing the law also is available. Public interest
groups, for instance, simultaneously can challenge laws in the courts and lobby
legislators for changes in those laws.
135. A contracting party has the option of changing an offending law or ab-
sorbing the retaliatory consequences. See supra note 75 and accompanying text
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In the wake of the trade accords, these proposed balancing
steps offer a reasoned way to realign federal and state interests
within traditional Supremacy Clause doctrine. The preceding
analysis showed that state tax systems that result in unequal
tax rates13 6 among the states and between the states and the
federal government are ripe for invalidation under the
Supremacy Clause. The Constitution however, equally protects
the states' right to tax and the federal government's right to reg-
ulate trade, and courts must examine the tension that results
when a challenged state law is allowed to stand. 37 Because
courts have not faced this question yet in terms of the new fed-
eral trade regime,'-3 this section proposes several factors that
courts can use to assess the tension between the state and fed-
eral system.
A. Is THE FEDERAL SYSTEM A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE?
A court first must determine if the federal system is a rea-
sonable alternative to the state system. This can include an
analysis of several interrelated issues, such as the amount and
type of information available to state decision-makers when
they adopted the state system, the appropriateness of the polit-
ical context in which the state acts, and the constituency of the
state in general. 139 This analysis allows courts to determine if
the tax in question is necessary in order to meet a legitimate
need of the state, or if it is the result of an improper effort to
defeat, explicitly or implicitly, federal policy decisions. 40 In ad-
(noting that NAFTA and the Uruguay Rounds Agreements authorize aggrieved
trading partners to retaliate under certain circumstances).
136. The effect is the same as long as the real tax rates differ. Of course,
rates between the states are not even nominally the same. See supra note 23
and accompanying text (discussing different state taxing methods).
137. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing preemption
doctrine in cases involving traditional state power).
138. Historically, in "one voice" or preemption cases challenging income ap-
portionment systems, the Court never found the available federal body of law
sufficient to meet preemption doctrine requirements. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's early application of the "one voice"
doctrine).
139. Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis,
in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTrrUTION 125, 132 (Louis Henkin et al.
eds., 1990).
140. For example, a state could levy a tax to discourage foreign investment
in a particular industry because it believes the federal government improperly
balanced economic growth with environmental protection in setting liberal in-
vestment rules. It is uncertain whether or not a court would determine this
motive improper. NAFTA specifically addresses environmental issues in the
accompanying agreement on the environment; the Uruguay Round Agree-
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dition, this analysis allows the court to judge the importance of
the tax as a revenue generator for the state.
B. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF RETAINING THE STATE
LAW?
If the state has made a legitimate policy decision to meet a
need that the federal system cannot meet, or if the loss of that
revenue generator will impede severely the functioning of the
state, the court should examine the consequences of a decision to
retain the state law.14 1 Specifically, the court should consider
whether the state law appears to violate a trade accord. 142 If the
state law does violate the trade accord, the court next should
consider the likelihood that a trading partner will retaliate if
authorized to do so under the auspices of a trade accord.' 43 Al-
ternatively, if the law does not violate the trade accord, the court
should consider the possibility that a trading partner will retali-
ate unilaterally on other grounds.-44 Finally, the court should
consider on whom the retaliation likely will fall.
These factors will help the court to gauge the size and scope
of the impact of retaining the state law. They also can be com-
pared with the importance of the law to the state in answering
the next question.
C. Is rr BETTER TO ABSORB THE POTENTIAL RETALIATORY
COSTS?
If the court determines that retaliation is likely, either
under a trade accord or unilaterally, it then must decide
whether, in spite of the potential for retaliation, it is in the best
interests of the country to accept the potential reprisals rather
ments, however, do not. GATT's record in balancing trade and the environment
is mixed. See JAcKsoN ET AL., supra note 64, at 535-42 (discussing a GATT
Secretariat report's analysis of the interaction between international trade and
the environment).
141. Maier, supra note 139, at 132.
142. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round Agreements).
143. Throughout the history of GATT 1947, only one contracting party ever
was authorized to retaliate, and the party ultimately declined to do so. JACK-
SON ET AL., supra note 64, at 330-31. One commentator observes that, since the
DSU provides for a more "automatic" method of authorizing retaliation, it prob-
ably will lead to more frequent use of such actions. Id. at 331.
144. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994), the United Kingdom threatened to retaliate if California did not alter its
income apportionment system. See Brief of the Government of the United King-
dom as amicus curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 8.
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than to invalidate the law.145 In making the decision, a court
should look at the probability and the potential size of the retali-
ation; the political and economic consequences to the nation as a
whole if the state is allowed to violate the trade accord; and the
magnitude of the hardship to the state if the court invalidates
the law.
CONCLUSION
This Note presents an analysis of the application of NAFTA
and Uruguay Round Agreements requirements to state law in
general. As a result, this Note can serve as one starting point to
investigate the possible consequences for the many state laws
that impact international trade, such as those relating to envi-
ronmental and labor regulation. The above analysis counsels
that state regulations should remain in place, even when they
conflict with trade accords, unless the potential commercial or
political retaliation is too great to warrant retaining the regula-
tion. This decision essentially will turn on the value that the
United States and its citizens place on the benefits of the regula-
tion, as opposed to an alternative method that is not violative of
the trade accords.
Unfortunately, in the environmental and labor arenas, the
alternative could mean less or no regulation at all. In light of
the importance of these state interests, courts must determine
more clearly the boundary between state authority over issues
impacting international trade and the states' continued ability
to exercise their constitutionally-reserved powers. This analysis
offers one method of redrawing the federalist boundary between
state and national power that considers and equally weighs both
state and federal interests.
145. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 560-61 (suggesting that it is ap-
propriate in the environmental sector for the U.S. to "pay" for extra environ-
mental protection by making additional concessions in trade negotiations
instead of removing an offending law).
1995] 265

